in addition to being a regular fire.
So on July 12th, 2020, the USS Bonhomme Richard was set on fire by a disgruntled 20 year old sailor who didn't get into the Navy SEALs on the first try. The Bonhomme Richard, an amphibious assault ship had been in drydock for two years for a 800 million dollar refit, which it was almost done. The fire raged out of control and gutted the ship, to the point aluminum parts of the ship were photographed melting. Now the final report on the fire has come out, and the amount of failures are....well, let me summarize:
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Investigators found inconsistent statements from crew members about the
actions to investigate the reports of smoke and fire alarms and why
there was a delayed reporting of the fire over the ship’s intercom
system – the 1MC.
“Numerous sources agree to having heard a rapid ringing of a bell but
disagree on whether the casualty was announced as ‘white smoke’ ‘black
smoke,’ or ‘fire,’ as well as the location of the casualty: ‘Lower V,’
‘Upper V,’ or ‘Hangar bay,’” the investigation found. “At 0820, the
Petty Officer of the Watch (POOW) noted in his log: ‘Fire reported in
Lower V.’”
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“In those early minutes, the sailors had no radios so they used their
own cellphones to communicate,” the lead investigator found. And the 1MC
“did not work in many areas of the ship to include DC Central;
and there was a lack of urgency. When initial responders from Ship’s
Force descended into Lower V, no one shared the same understanding of
what firefighting capability was online, contributing to their failure
to apply agent to the fire or set fire boundaries, which enabled smoke
and heat to intensify.”
Attack teams had trouble finding serviceable fire stations. In fact, 187
of the ship’s 216 fire stations – 87.5 percent – were in Inoperable
Equipment Status condition at the time of the fire, the report said.
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Moreover, there were no concerted direction nor any announcements from DC Central.
“The DC Central Watch Supervisor stated that neither he nor EDO
had an idea of how bad the fire was until later events forced them to
evacuate DC Central. At no point did either the DC Central
Watch Supervisor or EDO attempt to start any additional equipment or
activate Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) firefighting systems,”
investigators wrote.
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Worse, the ship’s installed AFFF systems weren’t put into action “in
part because maintenance was not properly performed to keep it ready and
in part because the crew lacked familiarity with capability and
availability,” the lead investigator wrote. Many of the ship’s hatches
and doors – a critical first line of defense to isolate a fire and slow
the spread – couldn’t be shut without disconnecting temporary utilities
in place for the maintenance availability work.
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At about 9:15 a.m., deteriorating smoke conditions in the hangar led the
CDO to order all personnel without SCBAs to evacuate the ship after he
had consulted with the ship’s captain. But the investigation found
“there are varying reports on whether this evacuation order was
communicated over the 1MC.”
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The fire response already was substantial, as subsequent fire alarms
broadcast calls for additional help, and the call for mutual aid
prompted local fire departments to send crews to the base. But an hour into the fire, no water or retardant had been laid onto the fire, even though FedFire crews had laid down their hose line toward Lower V. The
fire had spread unabated for nearly two hours before the first
firefighters – crews from the San Diego Fire Department – poured water
onto the flames.
That happened at 9:51 a.m. on the upper vehicle deck, where the city firefighters on their own initiative attacked a fire along the space’s starboard side.
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By then, the billowing smoke had turned heavy and black. One city
firefighting official told his teams: “This compartment is about to
blast.”
At 10:37 a.m., the on-scene command ordered all firefighting teams to evacuate the ship.
At 10:50 a.m., “approximately 90 seconds after the last firefighters had
departed the ship, a massive explosion occurred” aboard, according to
the report. The ensuing shock wave knocked down people on the pier and
blew debris across to Fitzgerald, and massive smoke billowed high into
the clear sky across San Diego Bay. The report said that if sailors and
firefighters had been aboard, several would have been killed.
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Bureaucratic divisions hampered firefighting efforts, the investigation found.
On that first day, BHR’s fire teams of sailors didn’t integrate with
FedFire crews. Ships around the waterfront began sending teams of
sailors to help fight the fire, but the effort “was unorganized”
initially before a coordinated watchbill was established. For
five days, the ship and FedFire worked from separate command posts on
Pier 2, without clear indications to others as to who was in charge of
the firefighting mission.
After San Diego Fire’s initial response and fire attack, fire crews did
not reenter the ship after it was evacuated. SDFD officials said they
would support from the pier but not reenter the ship, citing their
manual that reads: “‘[a]ctivities that pose a significant risk to
firefighters shall only be taken when there is potential to save
lives.'”
But it prompted frustration and disagreements with FedFire and the Navy
over the city department’s safety policies, investigators noted. After
discussing it with the Expeditionary Strike Group 3 commander, the
FedFire chief said he told the SDFD chiefs to leave “if they were not
going to provide meaningful assistance to fight the fire.
The noticeable departure of SDFD crews and vehicles was
followed by that of other localities who had responded to the mutual
aid call in the large-scale, regional fire response, further dampening
the mood on the waterfront amid the growing emergency in front of them.
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With the fire’s continuous spread, the Navy’s top concerns were the
failing integrity of the ship’s superstructure, a warping flight deck
and collapse of the cavernous hangar bay. That evening, in an agreement
between the Navy Southwest Regional commander and the San Diego mayor,
SDFD helicopters flew a mission to assess the fire’s impacts, and
thermal imaging showed 1,200-degree fires burning on the superstructure.
A few hours later, the first two Navy Seahawks began dropping saltwater
onto the ship in an aerial fire attack that totaled 1,649 water drops
over four days.
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“Although the CO, XO, CMC, [Chief Engineer], and DCA were all present on
the pier prior to the explosion,” the investigator continued, “they
failed to establish command and control of the situation and did not
lead action to integrate fire response efforts.
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The San Diego Fire Department's response, by the way, was completely correct: a rule among firefighters is to risk lives for lives, and risk property for property. Walking away when being told to risk your life for USN property or leave was one of the few correct decisions made.
The USN report also emphasizes that this is the second time the USN has lost a ship in the past ten years to arson while in drydock. The USS Miami (SSN-755), a Los Angeles class nuclear attack submarine, was gutted by a fire set by a dockyard welder who wanted to go home early. The USN report is understandably pissed off that no lessons have been learned.
