A Canadian Voter's Guide to the F-35 Part 2 - Fighting the Decepticons

OK, so the Cons did a terrible job in the F-35 procurement. They did less thinking about details than I did preparing these posts, and did no due diligence whatsoever on what is potentially the Dominion of Canada's single largest ever purchase. So the F-35 comes with a series of hidden costs and financial risks. Before moving on to what else we could possibly get (and the good news is that it is a buyer's market) I have to mention the series of technical risks the Cons couldn't be bothered to assess.

The essential problem is one that I alluded to last time - that there has been no assessment of what Canada actually needs. This issue is key with the F-35, as the Cons have decided to pay vast sums of money for the F-35 over less risky alternatives for an aircraft with Stealth - and it is not at all clear 1) Canada's next fighter plane needs this capacity, and, somewhat more comically, 2) that the F-35 has a durable and reliable stealth capacity.

Let me present the pro side of the argument first. Stealth, or LO (low observablity technology, because the military loves its acronyms) is camouflage for electronic sensors. While LO technology does not render aircraft invisible to radar, it makes detecting them vastly more difficult. In a air-to-air combat situation, hiding from sensors can allow you to get the drop on an opponent; versus air to ground radars it allows you to avoid detection. Avoiding detection in a air-combat environment is key, as modern air defenses are lethal to modern warplanes. Much cheaper than modern combat aircraft, even modest third world countries have formidable SAM (surface to air missile) systems bought from Russia. Even more worrisome (and more relevant, as combat between states with modern, traditional armed forces is the exception rather than the norm in wars today) shoulder-launched SAMs have also increased tremendously in lethality. This means that even in lower-intensity conflicts in the future, your average guerrilla force might be able to keep the other side from using aircraft.

If you want to read about this in a bit more detail, here's a good link. The author is a liberal ex-USAF officer, explaining why the A-10 being retired for the F-35 isn't dumb when you consider modern air defenses.

This is the strength of the F-35. If you think Canada is going to get involved in conflicts where the opponent will have modern air defenses, air superiority will be extremely difficult without stealth technology. If you say "well the Americans will have Stealth Technology so they can suppress all the modern air defenses first" remember that's true of centralized long range SAM systems, but not the shoulder-mounted ones.

But here we circle back to the need for assessment. First, is stealth a necessity or an option? Given the current stated goals of national defense planning, it is not clear that it is. Outlined in the "Canada First" defense strategy, the goals are:

1. Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD;
2. Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;
3. Respond to a major terrorist attack;
4. Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster;
5. Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and
6. Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.

 Maybe you disagree with the current defense goals, and that's fine. I'm just saying here that by the Government's official, stated goals in this area does little to suggest Stealth fighters are needed - especially as the government is letting so many other basic functions of the military decay due to under-funding. So let's forget Canada First for a moment. Then the point becomes more debatable. In the scenario I outlined above, LO technology would be necessary. But then we return to the question of reasonable assessment again. Is it worth the cost to prepare for this specific scenerio (once again) when so much else is being neglected?

Second, is it worth the cost? This is not a small question, as the F-35 is more expensive than other options, and cost comparatively more to run. (In the long run, maintenance and upkeep of modern warplanes usually exceed the purchase price, so this is not a small factor.) The cost issue is particularly important for Canada, as the Cons, in an effort to make the purchase more palatable to budget-minded supporters, have reduced the number of F-35s to be bought from 80 to 65, which is a small amount of futuristic invisible jets if you consider that 138 CF-18s were built, and has 79 remaining in operational use. 65 is the lowest the RCAF estimated it could go in air frame numbers, and Harper has stated the purchase price of the new fighter fleet could not go beyond 9 billion - unfortunately, thanks to the decline in the Canadian dollar, that will only buy us 54 invisible fighter jets.

The cost premium has to be assessed as well as Canada getting its money's worth. If the LO is flawed, then the F-35 isn't worth it. (I bring this up because the F-35's development stretches the meaning of the word torturous like a fat puppy being shoved tail first into a latex glove, and certain ill-judged decisions about making a vertical take-off variant throws all of the F-35's abilities into doubt.) The ability of the F-35 to be a good multirole aircraft is still in the early stages of appraisal. If it fails in LO or in the multirole, it is no good for Canada. The former failure would mean the Cons essentially got scammed, paying large premium on planes for an ability the F-35 didn't have, and the latter would mean Canada's fighters would be less functional than our old F-18s. The Cons tried to say we couldn't wait to replace our Hornets (initially slated to start in 2015) but evidently we could, as their service career has been provisionally expanded to 2025. The F-35 is a brand new airplane, with new and untested technology. The risks that some of the technology won't work out are made worse by LockMart refusing to release the source code for the F-35's OS - this means all servicing will have to be done through the dealer. This means any software problems will be much more expensive to fix. (It should be noted that LockMart is the only corporation taking this stand; all the other options come with much friendly service agreements.)

Another risk is the F-35's single engine. A major factor in the F-18 being selected in the early 1980s over its main sales rival, the F-16, was that it had two engines, not one. Having two engines rather than one is easily understood as an advantage in a nation as big as Canada, where one engine failure might spell the loss of a airframe or a death of a pilot. Having another engine is the most sensible of all flying contingency planning.

 I've been banging on about the constant lack of assessment being a flaw in the F-35. My own, personal thumbnail assessment of Canada's requirements is thus:

1. Must be multi-role.

2. Must have two engines.

3. Must be affordable, after a through and realistic appraisal of the costs and risks.

4. The cost must also allow for a equal or greater number of fighter planes than the assessed minimum of the RCAF.

5. Must have no problems operating in the arctic in winter.

6. Must be available in a reasonable timeframe to replace the CF-18. 

As mentioned before, it's a buyer's market for airplanes, thanks to the global economic downturn. Both these aircraft are sold by motivated sellers, and fit the thumbnail requirements of Canada's needs:

The F-18 E/F Super Hornet. The Super Hornet, despite sharing the F-18 number, is in fact a mostly new airplane; it was slipped around the U.S. Congress as a upgrade for an existing plane. Developed to replace the U.S. Navy's F-18s and F-14s, (ironically when the F-35 program started to be seriously delayed) the name really conveys its mission to be a better and more capable multirole fighter. The 'Super Bug' comes in both single and two seat versions, for the air-superiority and strike role respectively. Boeing, the manufacturer, has been shopping around the Super Hornet for some time. The F-18 E/F was even developed with making the servicing simple and similar to the old F-18. It is currently flown by the US Navy, and the RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force.)

(Note: for figuring out unit costs, and how many Canada could buy, I'm assuming that we're going to use Harper's upper limit, and quoting unit prices in USD. The stated budget cap is 9 billion Canadian, and at $0.70 to a US dollar that's $6.3 billion USD.)

Two Engines? Yes.

LO: A little, but not really.

Unit Cost: $60 million per plane.  At that rate, that's 105 aircraft.

Dassault Rafale - The latest in a long line of French multi-role fighters, the Rafale brings a lot to the table. Like the F-18 E/F, it's been in service since 2000, and has seen combat and is not stupidly expensive to service. The Rafale has a performance envelope and features list very similar to the F-18 E/F. It's also in my opinion the best looking of the new fighters, so obviously it should be picked. The French, thanks to the global economic malaise are eager to make a deal, even saying that Canadian Rafales could be assembled in Canada, which is the type of incentive the Fed understands. The Rafale is flown by the French Air Force, the French navy in a carrier based variant, and the Indian Air Force.

Two engines? Yes.

LO: Made partially from composites, the Rafale boasts some LO technology.

Unit Cost: $100 million. That's 63 aircraft.

There are several other options out there as well. The Eurofighter Typhoon is Europe's other Canard fighter. Developed by a pan-european consortium too boring to talk about, the Typhoon was originally developed as an air superiority fighter, where it excells. More recent attempts to adapt it as a multi-role fighter have been much more mixed. The Saab Gripen is Europe's other other canard fighter, and is worthy of consideration despite its single engine. It was developed by the Swedes specifically for robustness and simplicity, big virtues when the RCAF has a "fly 'em until the scrap yards won't take 'em" policy.

Ultimately, what is needed is not the perfect fighter, and it is useless to try for perfect, no matter how you define it (the most capable, the fifth generationist, the most baksheeh for the Fed to direct, etc.) What is needed is a reasonable assessment of Canada's needs, an objective look at the aircraft out there, and a decision, so the F-18 can be replaced as it reaches the end of its service life. Ultimately, what is needed is for our  leaders is some fortitude: to gather the facts but not to obsess, and to actually commit once a reasonable amount of background work has been done. That is what will make Canada's next fighter jet the right one.