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| A wind tunnel model of the "Me 364." |
As the Second World war expanded, so did the demands on the German aircraft industry. Not only did production numbers need to keep climbing, the Reich was now drafting experienced workers out of aircraft factories, creating a shortage of skilled labor. 1942 was also the year the dead raccoon under the Reich's procurement porch really began to stink. The Third Reich had pursued multiple strategies to get around the resources needed for strategic bombers - first, by trying to develop a heavy dive bomber in the form of the Heinkel 177. The second was a similarly ambitious project to develop next generation medium bombers which would have capabilities similar to other nation's strategic bombers. By 1942, both these attempts had failed. The He 177 was an unusable mess, and the Bomber B projects had been underpinned by the development of next-generation piston aircraft engines, which had proven too ambitious for Germany's manufacturers. The only aircraft capable of supporting U boat operations in the Atlantic was the Focke-Wulf 200, an airliner adapted to the role as a stopgap. After a surprisingly good run, the Condor was now failing badly, as it was totally unsuited to flying in contested skies.
In truth, these were mere consequences of another failure, that of Nazi war planning. The Reich had imagined a series of short, sharp wars to secure the Aryan race's place in the sun; instead it had embroiled itself in a conflict that were global in scale and set itself as its rivals the biggest economies on Earth. The Amerika bomber projects were in many ways a symbol of this contradiction: now that America had joined the conflict, there was a obvious need to damage the economy of the world's richest nation; at the same time, the development and fielding of a bomber fleet capable of doing that was as beyond the abilities of Nazi Germany as fielding tanks would have been to the American Confederacy.
Still, the Germans persisted. At the end of 1941, Generaloberst Ernst Udet, head of procurement in the Reich Luft Minsitirum (RLM), killed himself. His rival, Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch, took over the portfolio of procurement, and inherited all these problems. The Amerika bomber was often on the minds of the RLM heads, even as bombing of British industrial targets ended and the U-boats found themselves alone in the Atlantic. 1942 would see staff work done on bombing America, and the entry of not one but two new possible Amerika bombers. This was despite - or maybe because of - the rivalry between Milch, head of procurement, and the head of the corporation trying to produce the first Amerika bomber prototype: Dr. Willy Messerschmitt.
Demands for Big Plane Renewed
Milch's first move was to see if he could get the Me 264 program moving a bit more quickly. He attempted to shift production onto Dornier, but Dornier, like Messerschmitt was at capacity with other contracts. Wesser [a aviation firm mainly employed in contract work for other firms] tried to take the responsibility next, but wanted to move the whole works to its plant, and not just production. Messerschmitt balked at that, and the attempted moves came to nothing. Either due to antipathy towards Dr. Messerschmitt, or doubts about the program, Milch had already canceled the pre-production run of 24 that the Me 264 had on the books, saying that what the Luftwaffe really needed was fighters, tactical bombers, and transports. At the same time, Milch began showing interest in the other long range bomber designs, such as Focke Wulf's new Ta 400 proposal, or the Junkers 290. It's difficult to escape the idea that Milch was down on the Me 264, but in April 1942, he did something rather fair-minded. Milch choose three experts in the field of long range aviation to report on the worth of the Me 264 program.
Generalmajor Carl von Gablenz was head of the RLM planning office, and an old crony of Milch, having sat on Lufthansa's board of directors...but also a expert on long distance flight. He had flown Junkers 52 airliners across Asia, at one point having to ditch in Afghanistan and spending a month a prisoner in the caravan point of Chotan. Having experience in the 'heroic age' of air travel, he was equal parts mechanic, engineer, pilot, and businessman, making him ideal for assessing Messerschmitt's struggling project. Von Gablenz's assessment of the Me 264 was as follows: the Me 264, unless equipped with the magic Jumo 222 engines, does not have the projected range to bomb America. It is unlikely ever to have the range to bomb America, (especially with the bomb weight of 5 tons) unless refueled by the air. The first three prototypes are within a year of being competed if work is resumed. That doesn't mean the program is useless, however. First, a very long range aircraft is desperately needed for reconnaissance work over the Atlantic, and could find all manner of important uses, even just as recon for U-boats. Second, the Me 264 is "a step in the direction of future development." This includes the proposed Me 364, which appeares much more promising for having the range to bomb America. As a Amerika bomber, the Me 264 is the shortest, easiest development at this juncture. Other proposed types even for long range missions, let alone attacking America, are not even at the prototype stage. That makes the Me 264 program very worthwhile, even if the aircraft itself had limited potential.
The second assessment was done by Dipl. Ing. Roluf Lucht, a senior engineer at the RLM. He was concerned how constant revisions in the program were slowing down production, but his visit with Messerschmitt uncovered bigger problems. Lucht reported "Messerschmitt was a broken man. He was physically at a very low ebb and crazy with emotion. He was crying like a baby." This report was the final straw as far as Milch was concerned. He had Dr. Messerschmitt removed as the head of Messerschmitt, and replaced by Theo Croniess, a prominent Nazi party member. Dr. Messerschmitt would henceforth be restricted to being the head of development. Historians often interpret this as a straight political move - IE Milch displacing somebody he had a grudge with to administer Messerschmitt more directly, as he had with Junkers - but given all the problems Dr. Messerschmitt had at this point, I don't see him doing much better under a western administration. Certainly if a western executive had a nervous breakdown in a essential war industry, he would have been replaced, at least temporarily.
The third visitor in May 1942 to the Me 264 project was Major Edgar Petersen. Petersen was quite possibly the top expert in his field, and was one of the most experienced officers in the Luftwaffe in long range flight. He was the man who had been at the heart of the Fw 200 program, and the commander who trained the men of KG 40 to fly them in combat. Petersen was now in charge of the Luftwaffe's test flight centers. He found that Me 264 V1 was essentially complete, and all it needed to begin flight tests was suitable engines. Petersen's report was very similar to von Gablenz, saying that even if the Me 264 couldn't reach New York City, it could still be quite useful. Petersen also wrote that it might be possible to begin single aircraft raids against America in late 1943.
These positive results seem to have convinced Milch the Me 264 was a good idea, as he gave Messerschmitt more resources to complete the prototypes. It could also be that all the reports Milch himself had commissioned into the possibilities of the Amerika bomber had caused Nazi enthusiasm to bubble again. The RLM now desired to 1) complete the Me 264 and 2) get a series run of 30 machines - enough for at least one wing of 12 aircraft - as soon as possible.
Von Gablenz submitted a memo to Hans Jeschonnek, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, on the 12 of May 1942, assessing all the large aircraft the German manufacturers had been pitching as Amerika bombers. His general conclusions are:
- The four-engined Me 264 will be proceeded with as the quickest possible solution against the United States.
- The necessary mid-air refueling procedure will probably be worked out during 1942.
- For distances of up to 10,000 km [note: this means '5,000 km range'] the Ju 390 is best (heavier loads, better armament, parasite aircraft.)
- Investigations with the object of achieving a return flight to and from America without refueling (six-engined Me 264) will be stepped up.
- Use of the Ju 290 for distances of up to 8000 km [IE 4000 km range] will be investigated with a view to using the aircraft to refuel the four engined Me 264.
Schwencke had also taken the liberty of preparing a target list in North America. It was focused on high-value factories, especially those involved in the aluminum or aircraft industries. Electrical plants were deemed a poor target, as the North American power grid was so robust that seven or eight power plants would have to be taken out to seriously affect war production. The best single target to attack was the Panama Canal - but unfortunately that was out of range of even imaginary Nazi bombers.
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| A study on bomb density and damage on a hypothetical attack on Manhattan Island. |
Even Milch seems to have been caught up in this exciting new enterprise: his personal idea was using the Me 264 as a contact-keeper of convoys between New York and Newfoundland, an area of ocean filled with Allied Merchant ships.
"We don't have to send a whole air fleet over there. With just a few aircraft much can be achieved. The idea is not to demolish America, but only to force the United States to erect anti-aircraft defenses. Therefore, not only New York but also other areas of the United States should be on the receiving end of our bombs. Perhaps we could even fly from Petsamo in Finland over the North Pole to San Fransisco. That is probably not much further. Including the 10 percent reserve, it is 7,700 km."
Reality reasserted itself in July, when the Kriegsmarine checked in to point out that air superiority was being lost over the ocean. Western Europe now had 125 Luftwaffe bombers, while the British had some fifty daytime fighter squadrons. Despite RLM enthusiasm, the Me 264 prototype was further delayed. The landing gear had still not been delivered from the subcontractor, and the engines had yet to show up - and the skilled workers needed to actually build the thing were in acutely short supply. These problems lead to an assessment of how any sort of Amerika bomber could make an attack in 1943. There were only two possibilities:
1. A functional Me 264 has its range boosted by aerial refueling;
2. A BV 222 flies to the mid Atlantic, where it would be refueled by a U-boat on the outbound and return trip.
In October 1942, Major Petersen informed Milch that the six engined Me 364 was projected to have greatly improved performance compared to the Me 264. Milch, who had been hearing promises about the Me 264 all year, dismissed this with "the Me 264 is of only propaganda value." This dismissal may also have something to do with the estimates as to when squadrons could be fielded: the Me 264 was estimated to be in service in numbers by 1946 or '47. Dr. Messerschmitt, in contrast, thought 1944 remained a possibility. I can't comment as to the plauseability of either, though I think Messerschmit's estimate possibly could have been met - assuming a major infusion of investment in the program. Though there was also budgeting to consider: the Ju 290 was entering series production, and resources had to be concentrated on the new, desperately needed airframe. The Ju 390 and the Me 264 were put on the back burner.
Hermann Goering noticed that there was a problem with large aircraft and ordered his underlings to prioritize production of the Fw 200, Fw 300, He 177, He 264, BV 222, BV 238, Junkers 290, Junkers 390 and the Me 264/364 as much as possible.
In October or November, the RLM attempted again to shift the production of the Me 264 to Dornier. This failed, as Dornier still had zero excess capacity.
Towed fuel tanks, Parasites, and stranger things
Attentive readers may have noticed that range was an all consuming problem in the Amerika bomber program. The Nazis too, noticed this, and spent a fair bit of time trying to develop ways to boost the range of their aircraft, both for missions like the Amerika bomber, and to boost the mediocre range of their standard heavy bomber, the as-yet-still-not-operational He 177. The problem could be split into two parts: first, getting an aircraft overloaded with fuel off the ground and to altitude to conserve its fuel. The second was replenishing fuel whilst on a mission.
The simplest way to accomplish the first part (because it already existed) was to use aerial tugs to tow an aircraft into the sky. The very large gliders the Nazis used had seen the development of a specialized towing aircraft, the He 111Z. Though a bit loony looking, it was a simple solution that worked pretty well. The Nazis (like the Allies) had developed rockets to assist on take off, and these promised to have some help if an aircraft would otherwise have an absurdly long takeoff roll.
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| He 111 Z. |
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| Once again, sorta difficult to knock if it works. |
This work was high priority and went well. By 1942 Fieslser had identified several basic mechanisms for aerial refueling and tested them successfully. Most of their experimental methods revolved around the releasing of a tow line and then catching it with a fork-like device with the aircraft to be refueled, then passing along the refueling hose, where the crew on the refueling end would take it and plug it in to their aircraft's fuel system. The forthcoming Ju 290 had been identified as the best aircraft for aerial tanker conversion. The main obstacle at this point was the Luftwaffe General Staff, with staff chief Jeschonnek who thought the whole concept ludicrous and bound to fail. (Maybe Jeschonnek could imagine the fuckery that could happen when aerial refueling.)
Another, much more specific method for boosting range was using submarines to refuel BV 222s. By spring 1942 America had scored its great success in the Dolittle raid - an attack pointless from a military perspective but priceless from a morale one. While I doubt the Germans were aware of this, by May 1942 their Japanese allies had managed to succeed in a very similar operation. Kawanishi H8K "Emily" flying boats had flown to the remote French Frigate Shoals, where Japanese submarines refuelled them, enabling the H8Ks to fly on, and recon Pearl Harbor. The Italians had also managed some extremely long flights: by July 1942, Italy had managed a flight to Japan, and two years earlier, had flown from the Island of Rhodes to bomb a British oil refinery in what is now Bahrain. So there was good reason to think a long-range propaganda raid was reasonable.
What was less reasonable was the geography the Germans had to work with. The Japanese picked the French Frigate shoals as it made a good sheltered harbor for flying boats to land. The Germans would have to do the same thing mid Atlantic, and that posed major problems. World War 2 vintage flying boats need calm water to land on; beyond a light swell, a flying boat is likely to damage or destroy itself on the sea. Guaranteeing a calm sea both outbound and back, especially with the imperfect weather forecasting the Germans possessed would require quite a bit of luck. While a remote harbor could possibly be found in Newfoundland or Labrador, these were thousands of kilometers away from the main target, always New York.
You may have also noticed the term 'parasite aircraft' slipped into von Gablenz's report. The Nazis by this point were picturing gigantic aircraft flying across the sea, and pictured them attacking ships either with guided weapons then in development, or parasite aircraft, IE aircraft that could fly and dock with the enormous aircraft. These aircraft would be necessity be very small, and be powered by pulse jets. (A pulse jet is a very simple jet engine that would eventually be used by the V-1 'buzz bomb'. They are famous for having no moving parts and being punishingly noisy, even by the standards of aircraft engines, who's standards, let me tell you, are considerable.) Anyway, these jet fighters were not only seen as a effective way to attack ships, but a method of defending ultra-valuble Nazi wonderbirds against allied fighters.
The methods for docking and takeoff from another airplane were actually worked on thanks to a 1942 Junkers concept for a fast extreme range reconnaissance airplane, the EF 101.
The EF 101 was an attempt to make a reconnaissance aircraft with a global-spanning range - and one that would not risk itself over a enemy target by dispatching a short range fighter, in this case a Bf 109. With a projected range of 8500 km, the EF 101 could have performed recon flights over the United States and the Urals, but the project doesn't seem to have seen much development. Junkers did however, get the docking system working on a He 177/ Bf 109.
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| A Me 328 (nee P.1073B) mounted on a Ju 88. |
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| Wikipeida had this simple drawing that gives you the idea. |
Blohm und Voss - it's our job to blow your mind
Blohm und Voss saw the new push for the RLM to find a cheap, easily deployed Amerika bomber, and true to form, came up with a crazy proposal to meet this demand.
If you've been following this series, you know that Blohm und Voss was working on an extremely large flying boat, the BV 238. What the head of BV aeronautics, Dr. Richand Vogt, proposed was to take the design and engineering work done on the BV 238 and recast it into a conventional airplane of even larger dimensions, which was to be known as the BV 250. The "boat" part of the design would be dropped, and replaced with conventional landing gear.
It was another aircraft who's size was bordering on the B-36's. The BV 250's wingspan was 58m (190 ft) , its length was 46 m, or 151 ft. It also had a enormous wing area of 347 square meters, or 3,700 square feet. It managed to use available engines, DB 603 V12s, though BMW 801 radials were also seen as a viable engine. While not having a 4000 hp miracle combustion engine was definitely a mark for sensibleness, under heavy loads even with six engines the BV 250 would need assistance at takeoff, either from air-tugs or rockets. It also needed outrigger landing gear on its wings.
The advantages of the slab-sided monster airplane were for the most part simple economics. By recycling the design of the BV 238, a huge amount of time could be saved, and a huge amount of money, assuming the tooling for both was for the most part the same. What's more, the BV 250 was going to be multi-purpose. It could be loaded with up to 45 tons of payload over relatively short distances (2,500 km/1550 miles) or schlepp bomb loads of 20 tons up to 3500 km before returning. With 4000 kg of bombs the range extended to 5000 km. Stripped out for reconnaissance, Vogt's projections showed a ocean spanning range of 7500 km. Given this capability, the BV 250 would have been a natural for any far-east trade missions.
Despite this heroic effort at deployment speed and cost efficiency, it was not long before the RLM was accumulating doubt at the worth of the project. The first gripe was that it could not, in fact, fly bombs to America. It was also slow, and extremely large, which created, frankly, well founded doubt at the BV 250s ability to survive in defended airspace. The final straw was oddly that it would still take a "long" time to build. With a mythical amount of optimism assumed, and with Blohm und Voss's production facilities expanded via magic and maximum use of the "eastern European guest workers program", the earliest the prototype could arrive was in the middle of 1943.
The RLM said "thanks but no thanks", and Vogt returned to sketching asymmetrical airplanes, and working on the BV 238, which was eagerly awaited by both the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. For reasons I don't really understand, the RLM envisioned producing 86 BV 222s by the end of 1945, then phasing them out as more BV 238s became available. The number of BV 238s available by the end of 1943 was estimated to be four, with 1944 seeing the start of series production. In fact, the sum total BV 222 production would be 13.
Hungry like the Wulf
Focke-Wulf continued its refinement of its long range bomber concepts from the Fw 238 - sticking with a basic efficient design but now looking at conventional aluminum as an aircraft building material, and "acceptable safety load factors" while exploring four and six engine configurations. Many small design studies were made in 1942. While many capable bombers were proposed -including some B-36 sized giant designs - the RLM kept rejecting them. Then something very unusual happened. Focke Wulf would in July 1942 hit paydirt with their pitches - but for an aircraft that almost certainly could not attack America.
Aircraft designer Kurt Tank proposed a smaller aircraft - one with the dimensions and rough capabilities of a B-29 - with six engines. These engines could be anything fron the already in production BMW 801 radials to the exotic and still struggling to exist Jumo 222. This design would be known as the Ta 400.
The Ta 400 is unusual in a few ways. For one, unlike some of the other aircraft in these posts, it could draw on a long history - the design of the Ta 400 was something Focke-Wulf had been riffing on for years now, stretching back to its trans-Atlantic design studies. For another, a lot of work was put into the design; the design was tested extensively in wind tunnels and was looking for factory space to produce prototypes when it was canceled. Another difference (and it might have been unique in Third Reich arms programs) is that the Ta 400 was an international effort: Focke-Wulf involved French and Italian firms in design and production. When talking about Amerika bombers, the Ta 400 deserves an honorable mention even if it remained a paper project.
The Ta 400 was very close in size and configuration (save the two extra engines) to the B-29. It had fore and aft pressurized compartments for the crew, and used remote defense turrets. The fuselage was smaller than the B-29 - the Ta 400's crew was projected to be smaller, and I imagine they were packed in there He 177 style - but the bomb payload appears to be the same, and the wings were slightly bigger. Like the B-36 and the improved B-29, the B-50, Focke-Wulf would later add two jet engines to give the Ta 400 an extra boost of speed while on the attack run.
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Numbers to compare:
Boeing B-29 Superfortress
Crew: 11
Length: 30 m (99 ft)
Wingspan: 43 m (141 ft)
loaded weight: 54,000 kg (120,000 lbs)
Power plants: 4x Wright R-3350 radials, 2,200 hp each
Net power: 8,800 hp
Maximum speed: 574 km/h, 350 m/h
cruise: 350 km/h, 220 m/h
range: 5,230 km (3250 miles) [standard payload]
standard payload - 9,000 kg (20,000 lbs) bombs
Ta 400 (BMW 801 engines)
Crew: 9
Length: 28.7 m (94.1 ft)
Wingspan: 45 m (150 ft)
loaded weight: 60,000 kg (132,000 lbs)
Power plants: 6x BMW 9-801D radials, 1,700 hp each + 2x Jumo 109-004 jet engines, 1000 kg thrust each
Net power: 10,200 hp + optional jet boost
Maximum speed: 720 km/h (447 mph) [This figure is almost certainly with the jet engines at full thrust, and should not be confused with the cruising speed. The jets would likely be used on heavy takeoff rolls and for extra speed over enemy targets.]
cruise: 325 km/h (202 mph)
range with standard payload: Variable with engine. With BMW 801s, 4500 km (2,225 miles)
standard payload: 10,000 kg (22,000 lbs) bombs
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As the Ta 400 will remain forever unbuilt, it's difficult to say if these numbers were ultimately achievable - though I've going to try to do that anyway. The Ta 400 is frequently mentioned as an Amerika bomber project, but could only get within striking distance of the US east coast if it flew without any bombs, or had the most ideal engines, IE those nonexistent ones from the 'bomber B' program. Making things even more confusing is if this bomber could achieve these ranges with a significant bomb load. I bring all this up as broadly the Ta 400 was quite B-29-like in its performance, but certain engine configurations promised to double the Ta 400's maximum range. Maybe some smarty pants could simulate the relevant factors and tell us if Tank was full of shit or not, but until then, I can only observe that it seems optimistic.
There's other cautions as well: the B-29 cost more to develop than the atomic bomb, and was as close to a German style procurement failure as the United States got to; the only reason the design persisted was because of the matchless wealth of the USA. Ironically, the Ta 400 avoided some of these potential problems by sticking to a proven engine design, which might have removed some of the testing headaches. Like other Amerika bomber contestants, the Ta 400 was also envisioned as a long distance naval reconnaissance/attack aircraft, using the Hs 293 guided bomb and the "Fritz-X" anti-naval missile.The Ta 400 could also haul outsized bombloads if range could be sacrificed, like the B-29.
The RLM was intrigued but seemingly unsure if they should back this project; it seems the decision to develop it was made in late 1942. The RLM was well aware that this was a long term project. It seems the rationale for starting it was as a backup design to the Me 264 and the Ju 390. Though it would be likely several years when the Ta 400 could be fielded, it could replace the aforementioned models if and when they were deployed. So it was in a sense a backup design, to give the Third Reich a "standard" heavy bomber by the late 1940s.
Of course when the RLM gave the go-ahead, it meant that they had four long range strategic bombers in production: the Me 264, the He 177 family, the spinoffs of the Ju 290/390 and the Ta 400, all with somewhat overlapping ranges and capabilities.
Focke Wulf also attempted to address the failures of the Fw 200. They embarked for a time on studies on a "Fw 200 F", a Fw 200 design with an extra engine in the nose and fairly extensive modifications to make the Condor a proper naval bomber, including a tail gun position. These were abandoned when the results were deemed not worth it compared to a new design.
Heinkel - this is the year we stop catching on fire
In late 1941, there was some ambition at the RLM to make the production He 177 with aerial refueling gear as standard (Jeschonnek and the Luftwaffe staff objected to this strenuously, as they thought such a change was 1) useless and 2) would slow down the eventual-soon-it's gonna ship anytime now production of the He 177. Jeschonnek was wrong on both counts, as the He 177 didn't need help slowing down its deployment.
At the start of 1942, a very surprising change happened: Hitler and Goering began backing the idea of a proper strategic bomber. Previously, they seem to have believed that existing medium bombers could perform the role. This belief appears to be bad (or highly optimistic) information fed to them by their immediate subordinates at the RLM, Milch and Jeschonnek, who were strongly anti-heavy bomber, as well as of course in Hitler's case, Goering boasting. Goering also, er, didn't pay very close attention. After making the decision to bet everything on the He 177 and stopping development of other types (with its attendant negative results) he doesn't seem to have looked in after. An academic paper a kind person sent me (From ‘uralbomber’ to ‘amerikabomber’: The Luftwaffe and strategic bombing by RJ Ovary) mentions that Goering was shocked and surprised at the start of 1942 that the He 177 had linked engines. If this was a lie in the face of failure or a genuine bit of new information, who can say?
The cash value of this was that Goering was now for a conventional He 177, and Heinkel's low-key efforts to redesign the He 177 to use four engines to drive four propellers was given legitimacy. That didn't change that re-engineering would take time.
By the end of February 1942, Milch was forced to halt all test flights of the He 177, as engine fires still were regularly destroying aircraft. [Testing seems to have resumed on some limited basis, as in June 1942 Milch and Albert Speer were visiting an airbase, and happened to catch a test flight of a He 177 taking off with a full load of bombs. After climbing into the low lying clouds, the bomber reappeared, banking steeply, and sideslipped straight into the ground. The bomber's crew died. ] KG 40, the naval bomber group that operated the Fw 200, was also issued some He 177s that summer, but the aircraft were so unreliable that they were withdrawn from service. This slipping in and out of a total flying ban was made worse: Heinkel had requested instructions from the RLM as to what changes to make but had gotten no reply. It seems that the production of the He 177 was brought back in the autumn 1942, though grave doubts about the bomber project existed on every level. Some process akin to production started around this time. This was done by Arado under subcontract.
The He 274 was 5 months behind schedule, mainly due to the RLM making every other Heinkel project a greater priority. And like other heavy bomber projects, design work has been subcontracted out to France. Specifically, Paris. This was a very short distance for Allied bombers, but tentative plans remained to develop the He 274 and its prototype series in Paris, with flight tests to start in 1944.
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| A Ju 290 A-3. |
Junkers would manage an actual production aircraft success with the Ju 290. Developed from a civillian airliner (which had been developed from a cancelled 'Ural bomber' project, the Ju 89) it's first flight would be in July 1942. [I already did a post on the 290 if you are looking for the full story.]
The turn of discussion at the RLM about Amerika bombers clearly was heard by Junkers, who at the start of 1942 considered ways to make a cheap and cheerful very long range aircraft out of its forthcoming transport.
Milch immediately favored Junkers new hypothetical big'un over Messerschmitt's contender. In addition to any 'political' considerations Milch had, Milch also liked the efficiency of many different uses for a single basic airframe. The Ju 290/390 family would soon have a (hypothetical) version for nearly any imaginable job for a big airplane of the era - a fantastic efficiency for the perpetually overtaxed Reich Aviation Industry. The Ju 390 also flirted with the idea of a relatively cheap and easily deployed aircraft with an almost Amerika bomber range.
The problems that cropped up with the potential Ju 390 tempered Milch's optimism - for one, Milch recognized the immense utility of the Junkers 290, and didn't want production delayed on the yet-unmeasured merits of the Ju 390. There was the obvious engineering concerns of working out the new aircraft as well. At this juncture the RLM seems to have been picturing different production series of the Ju 290, with increases in takeoff weight: the Ju 290 B would be a 290 with bigger engines and a heavier max takeoff weight, and the Ju 290 C would be in turn a bigger engine d, heavier max takeoff weight than the B. A production series of the Ju 390 would properly speaking need the 'B', if not the 'C' improvements engineered. [Apologies if that is confusing, but the Ju 290 program generates confusion at points like you wouldn't believe.] Even the RLM optimists figured a series run for the Ju 390 could not happen before late 1945.
Milch decided that more study was needed, and ordered the construction of a prototype Ju 390 from existing Ju 290s - a 'flying mock up.'
Oh, and in July when the Ju 290 first flew, the EF100 was canceled for the second and final time.
Messerschmitt: butterfly in the sky
Compared to 1941 when it was the only girl in town, the Me 264 suddenly felt the heat of competitors. It also was assessed by several RLM and Luftwaffe experts, as detailed above. The Me 264 beat the odds, and by May 1942 was receiving more resources, with even Milch seeing it as a genuinely useful program. The ability of the four-engined Me 264 to attack Amerika was seen as minimal, but there was always aerial refueling. (I mean, in theory.)
By summer 1942 the work on the Me 264 V1 was just waiting on engines and certain sub-components, and the work on the V2 and V3 aircraft was underway. What's more, design work on the Me 364 appeared promising; if 'takeoff issues' could be solved, it appeared to actually have the range to attack America with existing aircraft engines. Engines finally arrived - they were Jumo 211Js, the latest version of the inverted V12 powering the Ju 87 and 88 bombers. Finally, on December 23rd 1942, the prototype Me 264 was ready for its initial test flight.
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| The first shot is from the Me 264's 'photo shoot', the second appears to be from a early test flight. |
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| The Me 264's fuel load was so heavy it was proposed it have extra wheels on its main landing struts. The struts fold inward toward the fuselage after takeoff, and the outer wheel would be jettisoned. |
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| Another early test flight shot; the landing gear remained deployed for safety reasons. |
The Me 261 V1 and V2 prototypes also flew a few times, though the DB 605 engines were no more reliable in this application than in the He 177. Testing of the first two prototypes now centered on endurance and altitude testing, as the first two aircraft didn't have self-sealing fuel tanks. A third prototype would have that feature, as well as new engines: DB 610s, another linked power system of two DB 605s developed for the He 177. The Me 261 V3 would not be completed until early 1943.
Meanwhile, Dr. Messerschmitt was hopefully recovering from all the stress and anxiety he'd been suffering. I'm not sure what the German stereotype would be for a man in Dr. Messerschmitt's situation, but I picture him in the garden in a wicker chair, sketching things while his servant plies him with Spanish orange juice. He's working on the P.1093A - the kind of aircraft Messerschmitt would build if not for all this facacta labor and material shortages.
Let me talk you through it. The P.1093A was larger than the Ta 400 and the B-29. It's wingspan was 63m (206 ft), length 39m (128 ft.) Max takeoff weight was projected to be 128,000 kg (282,000 lbs), which included a 6000 kg (13,224 lb) bomb load, and three parasite Me 328 fighters. Power was produced by eight diesel Jumo 223 24 cylinder engines making 2,240 hp. The range was projected to be 9000 km.
As a design, it seemed plausible. There was a certain element of Nelson's famous dictum "Never mind the maneuvers, just go straight at them" in the design, a nice change from most Amerkia bomber plans. The two places German over-complication kick in are (inevitably) the engines, which put out as much power as a B-29's radial but are diesel powered, and of course parasite pulse jet fighters. While it had a projected range greater than the B-29, the P.1093A was considerably smaller and had a much smaller bomb capacity, suggesting the design might have been able to achieve most of the USA's Eastern Seaboard.
For where Nazi ambitions had gone, this aircraft was ideal: it could bomb America, support the U-boats, and attack and defend itself with guided munitions and teeny-tiny fighter jets. Of course, the RLM couldn't dream of developing it. All the new large aircraft commitments it had taken on in 1942 had filled up its dance card for years to come.
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In November 1942, the overextended German position at Stalingrad was surrounded and cut off by the Red Army. The Luftwaffe was assigned an impossible task by Hitler: resupply the vast army by the air. Despite mobilizing every conceivable airframe and using bombers as transports, the result was something that would be called a disaster in its own right, had it not happened next to Stalingrad. In order to get more transports, Ju 52s used as multi-engine trainers were sent to the eastern front, along with the pilots who trained Luftwaffe bomber pilots. Many of these pilots would die flying supplies, causing Goering to later describe Stalingrad as the "funeral pyre of the Luftwaffe bomber corps."
In the contest of our more eccentric narrative, Stalingrad saw the first operational deployment of the Junkers 290 and the Heinkel 177. The Ju 290 acquitted itself well all things considered; the He 177, not so much. First, it was discovered that the bomber couldn't really carry much more supplies than the He 111, which caused the 12 to be reassigned to flak suppression. (The Soviets foresaw the German airlift, and had placed many, many flak batteries between the German lines and Stalingrad.) Front line armorers equipped these aircraft with the Panzer Mk.III's 50mm autocannon for this mission, but 10 of the 12 aircraft deployed were still lost - all due to engine fires, not enemy action.
If anybody noticed that the first operational mission of the Luftwaffe's heavy bomber was for a stopgap mission it was never designed for against the Soviets, they kept their comments to themselves.
Part 1: Black Gay Hitler
Part 2: Vauge Plans and Flying Boats
Part 3: Walking on Sunshine
Part 5: Eris is Goddess
Part 6: Ragnarocky Road
Part 7: Look Busy and Hope Americans Capture You
Part 8: Rocket-Powered Daydream Death Notes
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